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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
UTAH DRY KILN COMPANY, INC., 
KING BROS., INC., a corporation, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ( 
I 
-vs- Case No. 10931 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIE,F OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District 
Court, after a trial on the evidence, of no cause of action in 
favor of the Defendant and Respondent. The action was by 
a claimed materialman (and assignee of another material-
man) to recover in a direct proceeding against a contracting 
party, not an owner of any interest in the land upon which 
the construction was developed, for the furnishing of ma-
terial to a dry kiln in Panguitch, Garfield County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court entered judgment for the Defendant 
and against the Plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant and Respondent urg.es affirmance of the 
trial court's decision. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
. Because the transcribed reporter's notes are numbered 
mdependently from the other portions of the record ref . 
t t t" · ' er ences o es imony will be: "(T ............ ) " Other refer.ences 
to the record will be: "(R .......... ) ". Appellant is referred 
to as the "Plaintiff" and Respondent as the "Defendant". 
Defendant, Utah Dry Kiln, is a corporation organh~ed 
in 1939 or 1940 (T. 47) primarily to cure, market and ship 
lumber (T. 48). It kilned (cured) and sold lumber acquired 
from Crofts-Pearson Industries and J. E. Crofts and Sons, 
two separate partnerships (T. 52) but purchased lumber 
from other sources (T. 48, 127). In 1959 Defendant entered 
into a contract with an Oregon corporation known as "Ore-
gon Dryer Company" to build a dry kiln at Panguitch (T. 7 
and 10). 
It is significant that Oregon Dryer Company's repre-
sentative had been in Utah "endeavoring to sell his equip-
ment" ( T. 29). Pursuant to these efforts Utah Dry Kiln 
was invited to Oregon to inspect this kilning equipment 
where the Manager, Dwain Pearson, was shown such, if not 
the same, equipment as was later shipped to Panguitch for 
the kiln development. (T. 29). Mr. Pearson was later flown 
"south" to see "identical" equipment installed and in opera-
tion (T. 29, 30). 
Of the total contract price of $24,000.00, the Defendant 
paid to Oregon Dryer Company approximately 50% (T. 69) 
which substantially exceeded the proportionate part of the 
total contract which Or,egon Dryer completed (T. 36, 37). 
In addition, Oregon Dryer Company left the job requiring 
Defendant to rebuild the equipment, install it, and to furn· 
ish an expensive but essential conveyor, expending much 
mo~e tha~ the contract price in doing the work themselves 
(T. 36-41) and sustaining over $20,000.00 in actual, indepen· 
dent damages by Oregon Dryer's defaults (T. 42-47) · 
While there is no evidence whatsoever in the record 
that any purchases made by Oregon Dryer Company .fro!ll 
the Plaintiff or Plaintiff's assignor, Mead and Associates. 
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were in any way incidental to the Panguitch job, the Plain-
tiff claims that either it or its assignor are materialmen to 
the kiln project entitled to sue Defendant as an owner of 
land enhanced by the value of equipment Oregon Dryer 
Company may have purchased from Plaintiff and its as-
signor. 
The Defendant did not ,ever and does not now own any 
interest in the land on which the contract was to be per-
formed (T. 48, 49, 122, 139, 142). 
The Trial Court, on undisputed evidence, found that: 
(Finding No. 4. R. 58) * * * the land upon which 
construction of the dry kiln was commenced w a s 
owned by ,either Crofts-Pearson Industries, a part-
nership, or J. E. Crofts and Sons, a partnership; 
that said partnerships are respectively the owners 
of two adjacent tracts of land in Garfield County 
near the town of Panguitch and the dry kiln con-
structed near the boundary common to those two 
tracts; however, the evidence does not establish on 
which or upon whose tract of land, as between the 
partnerships Crofts-Pearson Industries and J. E. 
Crofts and Sons, the construction work was devel-
oped. 
5. The Court finds that the Defendant did not own 
any interest in either tract of land or the land on 
which the dry kiln was constructed and did not have 
either a written or verbal authorization or any per-
miRsion of the partners in either Crofts-Pearson I~d­
ustries or J. E. Crofts and Sons to construct the kiln 
upon the site on which the work was prosecuted. 
However the kiln was built upon said land without 
objection. 
6. The Court finds that the owners of the land re.-
ceived no benefit from installation of the kiln upon 
their property but that the Def;endant, Utah Dry 
Kiln Company, Inc., had no interest in the 1 and 
either in fee or under any leasehold estate but held, 
if anything, only a license at suffe~ence of the true 
owners, having been permitted to go upon the land 
without objection by the owners thereof. 
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The only relationship Defendant might have with th 
land is what may be characterized as a license terminable a~ 
the will of the owners. T h e owner of the land was not 
established but it may be either J. E. Crofts and Sons 
which is a separate partnership consisting of a man (J. E'. 
Crofts) who is neither associated with Crofts-Pearson Ind-
ustries nor with Utah Dry Kiln and his sons, (T. 113) or 
Crofts-P·earson Industries which in 1959 was a sawmilling 
partnership but since 1963 has been a corporation (T. 130). 
Although the Plaintiff did not establish whether J.E. 
Crofts and Sons or Crofts-Pearson Industries owned the 
land on which the kiln was constructed, it is clear that one 
of the two owned the land as their r.espective boundaries 
were common and may have "overlapp.ed" (T. 116). None 
of the partners of J. E. Crofts and Sons was ever consulted 
about use of the land (T. 139). 
WhHe the Defendant, Utah Dry Kiln, cured and mark-
eted lumber for CPI and J. E. Crofts and Sons, they purch-
ased lumber for kilning and resale from other sources (T. 
48, 127). There was no benefit to the owner of the land that 
Utah Dry Kiln be allowed to locate on the premises (T. 132, 
133, 146). The Court so found, (R. 58, Finding No. 6) and 
it was uncontroverted. 
If Utah Dry Kiln were required to surrender occupancy 
of the premises, the owner of the land undoubtedly could 
remov.e it but the property Plaintiff sues on could be remov· 
ed without damage either to it or to the land (T. 130) · 
The Plaintiff raises for the first time on appeal the 
argument that the principle of alter ego should be invoked 
here. It is neither pleaded nor proved. 
M ore conclusively prohibiting application of th~ t 
theory, the Plaintiff did not prove on whose land the ki~~ 
was built (T. 113, 116, 128) so it is not know_ n a\~othe 
against whom Plaintiff seeks to apply the doctrine. . .. 
C ft d s which 1~ property w e r e owned by J. E. ro s an on~, . 
most probable, then we have a partnership owmng store,. 
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agricultural land and separate lumber interests, in existence 
for 40 years, some but not all of whos.e partners own some 
but less than a majority of the stock in Utah Dry Kiln, 
(T. 126, 136, 140) but have no other relationship to Defen-
dant (T. 142, 143). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT C 0 R R E C T L Y APPLIED THE 
STATUTE (SECTION 14-2-1) 
A. AN INTRINSIC ELEMENT OF A CAUSE OF AC-
TION UNDER SECTION 14-2-1 IS OWNERSHIP BY 
THE DEFENDANT OF AN INTEREST IN LAND:Jii 
B. DEFENDANT DID NOT NOR D 0 ES NOT NOW 
OWN ANY INTEREST IN ANY LAND. 
POINT II. 
THE MATERIAL OF PLAINTIFF AND ITS ASSIGNOR 
WAS NOT "FURNISHED UNDER THE CONTRACT". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL C 0 U R T CORRECTLY APPLIED THE 
STATUTE (SECTION 14.-2-1) 
A. AN INTRINSIC ELEMENT OF A CAUSE OF AC-
TION UNDER SECTION 14-2-1 IS OWNERSHIP 
BY THE DEFENDANT OF AN INTEREST IN 
LAN~ 
B. DEFENDANT DID NOT NOR D 0 E S NOT NOW 
OWN ANY INTEREST IN ANY LAND 
To justify application of this statute the Utah Supreme 
Court in Liberty Coal & Lumber Co. vs. Snow, 53 U 298, 178 
P341 (1919) Deasoned that: 
*Harries v. Valgards on, et. al. 
_u2d , _PZd_ 
Case No. 10829. Decided 
September 25, 1967 
lliiu,., . , \ I I •:' , '4>j<1 ··~•; ... ~~,...,.it ,:'l'r'"li 
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The purpose of t~e statu_te is to I?revent the owners 
of Ian~ from havmg their lands improved with the 
m~tenals and labor furnished a n d performed by 
third pei::sons, and thu_s to enhance the value of such 
lands, without becoming personally responsible for 
the reasonable v a 1 u ·e of the materials and labor 
which enhances the value of those lands. 
The evolution of Section 14-2-1 galvanizes the legisla-
ture's intention to make ownership of land an essential ele-
ment of liability. The first enactment (Ch. 91, L. 1915) 
stated: 
Any pers01~ V.'ho ma!-::es a contract * * * (provid'ng 
substantially as the statute now reads) * * * 
"Any person," as used herein, refers to the owner of 
the land, or of any interest therein, whether acting 
directly with, or through any other person author-
ized by, or acting with the knowledge and consent of 
such owner. 
The underscored text was eliminated by the 1933 revi-
sion of the Code. 1 
This section's history, inherently influential in its in· 
terpretation,2 expresses an intention to eliminate acquies.-
cence by the owner as sufficient basis for a cause of action. 
The omission of a provision in an amended statute is pre· 
sumed to be intentional.3 
As r.evised, the statute provides simply that to become 
liable the contracting party, provided the agreement ex· 
ceeds $500.00, must own an intevest in the land. 
In order to predicate an action upon a liability or .en· 
force a new remedy created or given by a statute and un-
known to the common law, one must bring himself strictly 
within the operation of the statute. Vol. 1, Am. Jur. 2d 
Page 602, Actions, Sec. 73. 
· · B k an 88 U 424• Sec. 17-2-1 Rev. Stat. 19:;:1. See State Tax Co!"mrnswn vs. ac m • 
55 P2d 171, distinguishing revision from comp1lat10n. 
2 
50 Am. Jur 276, Statutes Sec. 295. 
:; 
50 Am. Jur 262, Statute' Sec. 275. 
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This same text continues: 
W~ere in creating a right of action which did not 
exist at common law, the statute fixes the conditions 
upon which the right may be asserted these condi-
tions are an integral part of the right granted and 
are substantive conditions, the observance of which 
is essential to the assertion and benefit of the lia-
bility itself. * * * An action created by statute can 
be maintained only for the benefit of the persons 
specified in the statute and against such persons as 
are contemplated by the statute. 
The statute in question should be strictly construed on 
the ground that it is "penal" in nature. Bulk sales acts, hav-
ing- the cognate effect of requiring a person in default to 
pay twice, once to the seller and once to the seller's creditors 
if he does not comply with the statute, have been held to be 
"penal", in derogation of the common law, and to be strictly 
construed. United States vs. Goldblatt Bros., CAA Ill., 128 
F2d 576, 579; Zenith Radio Corp. vs. Mateer, 35 N. E. 2d 
815, 816; 311 Ill. App. 263. And the Mechanics Ven Statute 
providing for double liability of the lienor in improper dec-
laration of liens was termed "penal" comm:md ng· a sfr;{'.t 
construction in Collins vs. Peckham Road Corp. 236 NYS2d 
415, 418; 18 AD2d 860. 
The cas.e annotated and some of the cases collected in 
the note at 55 ALR2d 877 conclude that statutes similar to 
the one in question are, largely on the ground that they are 
characterized as penal, to be strictly construed. 
No statute - penal or remedial - should be construed 
any more broadly or given any greater effect than its terms 
require. Where a statute is clear in limiting its application 
to a particular class of cases there is no authority to trans-
cend or add to the statute or .extend it to related cas.es not 
falling within its exp res s provisions. 50 Am. Jur. 215, 
Statutes, Sec. 229. 
In this action the Defendant corporation, engaged for 
25 years in the business of servicing an d selling lum~er, 
entered into an agreement to establish a kiln proj·ect which 
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ultimately arose on land owned by one of its two princip I 
suppliers of lumber (T. 7, 10, 47, 48, 52, 127). The reco:d 
does not disclose on whose property the proj,ect was devel-
oped. (T. 116); but the evidence is undisputed that if the 
owner were ,ever to protest, then Utah Dry Kiln not only 
must (T. 123) but, without any damage to the kiln, the 
equipment subject of this action, or the land, also could 
(T. 130) move everything. 
There was no benefit or advantag,e to the land owner 
(whoever it may be) in having the kiln on its property. An 
offi0er of each of the possible owners of the land, Crofts. 
Pearson Industries (T. 132, 133) or J. E. Crofts and Sons 
(T. 146), so testified. 
The reason why Utah Dry Kiln followed its principal-
but not exclusive (T. 48, 127) - trade suppliers to this loca-
tion is best illustrated by the testimony of an officer of 
Utah Dry Kiln that: 
We will have to take the risk (of being evicted) for 
the ad v a n t a g e that we had in placing it there 
(T. 123) (supplied) 
B. DEFENDANT DID NOT NOR D 0 E S NOT NOW 
OWN ANY INTEREST IN ANY LAND 
It is horn-book law that a license is not an inter.est in 
the land4 
There are no minutes or writings of J. E. Crofts and 
Sons (T. 142) or of Crofts-Pearson Industri-es (T. 48, 49) 
creating any interest that would survive the Statute ~f 
Frauds 5 or which would create any interest of any sort in 
Utah Dry Kiln. There was never any verbal representation 
or declaration of a lease or other property interest to Utah 
Dry Kiln (T. 50, 141, 142) 
4 "A 1 · . I rty may be defined 
3·> A Jur '198 Licenses Sec. 91: 1cense in rea prope . a~ a 1!1· * * p~iviiege to do' one or more acts on land ~it~out pos~~ssing an 
interest therein. Indeed the distingui.shing ch~racter1st1cs. of a h{ense 
are that it gives no interest in land and that it may rest in paro · 
5 
Sec. 25-5-3 UCA, 1953 
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A bare license does not constitute a contract or grant 
any title or interest in the property.6 
The Plaintiff seems to argue in its brief for application 
of the doctrine of alter ego or disregard of the corporate 
identity of Utah Dry Kiln. This was neither pleaded nor 
proved. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Shaw vs. Bailey-
McCune, 11 U2d 93, 355 P2d, 321 this Court held application 
of that doctrine to be particularly within the province of the 
Trial Court a n d in disregarding the entity courts should 
exercise great caution. The doctrine is to be applied only 
in cases of fraud, contravention of law or statute, or a public 
wrong. 
A corporate entity may not be disregarded simply be-
cause it stands as a bar to a litigant's 11ecovery. 18 Am. 
Jur2d, 562 Corporations, S.ection 14. 
Schenley Distillers Corp. vs. United States, 326 U. S. 
432, 90 L. Ed. 181, 66 S. Ct. 247, holds that even wher.e those 
in control of the corporation deliberately adopt the corpor-
ate form to secure its advantages (certainly not the case 
here), the corporate entity still will not he disregarded. 
In the case before the Court, Utah Dry Kiln was incor-
porated and in business long before any of the other busi-
ness organizations who own the land in question were con-
ceived (T. 48). 
This theory, which Plaintiff seems to be raising for the 
first time in this appeal, is wholly without merit. 
POINT II. 
THE MATERIAL OF PLAINTIFF AND ITS ASSIGNOR 
WAS NOT "FURNISHED UNDER THE CONTRACT" 
Section 14-2-2, UCA, 1953, states that persons within 
the purview of Section 1 of that chapter shall be personally 
3:J CJS 810, Licenses Sec. 84 
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liable to all persons who have furnished materials "u d 
the contract". The 1966 Idaho case of Layrite Product~ er 
Lux, 416 P2d 501, is strikingly similar, applying a statL~ts~ 
substantially identical to 14-2-2. 
In that case the contractor and claimed materialman 
(the. latter being the Plaintiff) were both Washington corp-
orations and the Defendant was an Idaho resident con-
structing a home. 
Layrite Products sold materials to the contractor in 
various transactions throughout the immediate past. 
Layrite contended the materials sold and later used in 
the Defendant's home werie sold "with reference to" the 
particular job. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held, 416 Pacific at 504: 
Statutes such as the Idaho provision which permit a 
lien for materials furnished * * * do not include the 
furnishing for general or unknown purposes or an 
ordinary sal,e in the usual course of trade or upon a 
general open account or a sale without any reference 
as to what shall be done with the material sold. It 
has been held that * * * it is not essential that at the 
time the materials are sold the parties have in con· 
templation any particular building or structure. The 
weight of authority, however, holds that it is .essen· 
tial that the materials shall have been sold or furn· 
ished for the specific purpose of being in the parhc· 
ular building on which the lien is claimed. Adell· 
tionally, the materials must have been furn:shed on 
the credit of the building and not merely on the gen· 
eral and personal credit of the owner, contractor, or 
some other person. 
Th e foregoing precisely fits the fact situation here 
(T. 29, 30). 
It is a part of the Plaintiff's burden to prove that the 
property was "furnished under the contract". 36 Am. Jur. 
1st 62, Liens, Sec. 75. 
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So far as the record shows the sale was ,entirely com-
pleted in Or,egon and the equipment came to Utah as the 
property of Oregon Dryer Company with respect to whom 
Plaintiff and its assignor are only general c11editors. 
The record is devoid of any proof that the materials 
were furnished under the contract. In fact the Plaintiff's 
complaint alleges that the ,equipment was the subject of an 
unqualified sale to Oregon Dryer Company in October of 
1959 (Complaint Para. 2, R. 1). 
There was a proposal by the Plaintiff (T. 64) that the 
Court find the material was furnished under the contract 
but the Court rejected this motion (T. 65). 
The evidence is entirely to the contrary; Utah Dry Kiln 
went to Oregon and saw Oregon Dryer Company fabricating 
or working upon kiln equipment such as that used at Pan-
guitch (T. 29, 30). The Oregon Dryer Company r 1epresent-
ative declared that they would be "responsible for the equip-
ment" (T. 12). The relationship of general creditor only 
existed between the two Oregon corporations. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully conclude that the Plaintiff did not, and 
could not, establish t h e statutory elements of a cause of 
action under Section 14-2-1 because the Defendant was not 
an owner of land and the record is totally silent with r,espect 
to any evidence that the equipment was furnished under the 
contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
